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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN W. SPENCER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. C~se No. 8538 
L. C. CROWTHER, et al, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Under date of ~I a)' 29, 1951, the plaintiff, then a 
police officer in the Police Department of Salt Lake 
City, was discharged from the Police Department for 
the reason that he was not a bona fide resident of Salt 
Lake City. He appealed such discharge to the Civil Serv-
ice Commission on l\f.ay 31, 1951. On June 8, 1951, pur-
suant to a directive of the Civil Service Commission, the 
defendant Chief of Police Crowther filed a complaint 
with the commission specifying as ground for discharge 
that plaintiff was not a resident of Salt Lake City as 
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required by Section 15-6-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, 
now Section 10-6-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and so 
was ineligible to hold office ~s a police officer. 
On November 1, 1951, plaintiff requested a hearing 
before the Civil Service Commission, which request was 
denied. rrhe denial of a hearing came about because in 
another identical case involving another officer the 
District Court of Salt Lake County had held that the 
Civil Service Commission did not have jurisdiction to 
entertain an appeal from a discharge based upon the 
failure of an officer to maintain residence in the City 
and that only the courts could adjudicate that matter. 
X othing more was done until ::\Iay 1, 1953, eighteen 
nwnths later, when plaintiff filed thi.s action, seeking 
reinstatement and compensation from June 1, 1951. The 
complaint recites the foregoing facts except the reason 
for the commission denying plaintiff's request for a 
hearing. The defendants filed a 1notion to dismiss on 
the following grounds: 
1. That the Complaint failed to state a claim. 
2. That the court lacked jurisdiction of the sub-
ject 1natter, as being cognizable only by the 
Civil Se1Tice Connnission. 
3. That plaintiff was guilty of laches. 
This 1notion wa~ denied. 
Defendants fih~d answers on June 9, 1953, as the 
nwtt<'r w.a~ set for trial before Judge :~\[artin l\L Larson. 
-:\ o trial wa~ held, howeyer, and the Iuatter was per-
mitted to go dormant for another two years, when an 
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amended complaint was filed August 17, 1955, to bring 
in a newly elected City Commissioner and two new mem-
bers of the Civil Service Commission. On August 4, 1955, 
defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 41 (b) 
for failure to prosecute, more than two years having 
elapsed since the filing of defendants' answer. This 
motion was denied August 11, 1955, upon plaintiff agree-
ing to waive all salary due him since June, 1953, and 
defendants' answer should stand as to the amended 
complaint. Demand wa.s then made for trial and the 
case was tried on l\iarch 27, 1956, nearly five years from 
the date of discharge. 
The trial court found the facts to be in substance 
as follows: That plaintiff, since 1938 to June 1, 1951, 
vv.as employed by Salt Lake Crty as a police officer, 
third grade, subject to the rules and regulations of the 
Civil Service Commission of Salt Lake City; that on 
1\fay 29, 1951, the Chief of Police, L. C. Crowther, served 
written notice of discharge upon plaintiff, specifying 
that he was removed from the pay roll until such time 
as he became .a bona fide resident of Salt Lake City; 
that plaintiff appealed from said order to the Civil Serv-
ice Commission of Salt Lake City; that a complaint was 
filed with said Commission by the Chief; that thereafter, 
by arrangement with the Chief of Police and the Civil 
Service Commission, plaintiff was given until September 
4, 1951, in which to move back into Salt Lake C:i t~r as a 
resident thereof; that plaintiff on said date informed the 
Civil Service Commission he had decided not to move 
back into the City and thereupon his name was removed 
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from the classified Civil Service rolls· that on November 
' 1, 1951 plaintiff requested a hearing before the Com-
Jnission and such request was denied and his appeal to 
the Commission dismissed; that thereafter plaintiff 
brought this action; that plaintiff was not on May 29, 
1951, or on June 1, 1951, nor had he been for several 
years prior thereto, and was not thereafter during the 
remainder of 1951, a qualified resident and elector of 
Salt Lake City, but during all of said time plaintiff was 
a resident of Salt Lake County outside the lin;rits of 
Salt Lake City and so was ineligible to hold office as 
a police officer of Salt Lake City. Judgment was 
entered dismissing plaintiff's complaint. 
STATEl\{ENT OF FACTS 
The appellant's stateinent of facts is so sketchy that 
we deem it necessary to 1nake a detailed statement. The 
page references are to the record page numbers. 
Plaintiff's fan1ily consists of himself, his wife aml 
~on, 13 years of ag-e (p. 66). He becrune a 1nember of the 
Ralt Lake Cit~~ Police Deparhnent in 1938. He and hi8 
fmnily moved fron1 :2()-1-(1 Beverly Street. in Salt Lake 
Cit~·. to a home in the county, located at :2111 \Yalker 
Lane in the ~pring- of 1 !1-1-8 because of his boy's health 
( p. fiS- p. G9). In 1950 he was adYised by the Chief that 
he wonld have to be a resident of Salt Lake City (p. 69). 
He then left his family at \Y.alker Lane and rented a 
r·oom at :w-1- J1Jast 6th South in Salt Lake City and stayed 
there ahont ~ix werks, paying $20.00 a 1nonth. He then 
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moved in with his brother, Clyde, at Fairmont Apart-
ments, paying him as high as $20.00 per month (p. 7 4, 
84). This apartment consisted of .a kitchen, a living room, 
a bedroom, bath and sleeping porch (p. 103). Plaintiff 
slept on the sleeping porch and stayed there until Decem-
ber, 1950 (p. 75). Then he rented a room at 823 Elm 
Avenue with his aunt for $25.00 per month and stayed 
there until June, 1951. From there he went back to the 
vValker Lane residence about a week after his discharge 
from the police department. He and his family lived 
there until July 1, 1952, when they all moved to 2731 
Fillmore Street in Salt Lake City where he has since 
resided (p. 78). 
He was registered and voted in District No. 68 in 
Salt Lake City in 1942 to 1948, inclusive, his residence 
being given as 2646 Beverly Street. Notwithstanding 
he moved to Walker L.ane in the spring of 1948 he never-
theless voted that fall in District No. 68. He registered 
in 1950 at 1the Fairmont Apartments but apparently did 
not vote that year (Exhibit 1). 
During the time he stayed at Sixth South, Fair-
mount Apartments and Elm Street he had his work 
clothes with him. His other clothes were at vV alker 
Lane. He h.ad no cooking utensils with him and no furni-
ture except a bed and bedding while staying at Fairmont 
Apartments. This he returned to Walker Lane when he 
went to Elm Street. Neither his wife nor boy ever stayed 
with him at Sixth South, Fairmont Apartments or Elm 
Street. His wife prepared no meals for him there. All 
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this time his wife and boy lived at Walker Lane. He 
would go home to Walker Lane practically every day 
while he was staying at Fairmont Apartments and Elm 
Street, and would sometimes stay there overnight. He 
had his meals there when he was there. Upon getting 
his notice of discharge on May 29, 1951, he went back 
to Walker Lane within a week (p. 83 to p. 87). Except 
for the ban on living outside of the city he would have 
lived at \Valker Lane all of 1951 (p. 90). 
He and his wife were not estranged. His boy 
attended school in the county and gave his home addres:; 
as 2111 Walker Lane. Plaintiff gave his name as parent 
and address at the same place. All groceries purchased 
were for the \V alker Lane home. Plaintiff worked in the 
yard there, made repairs, had his laundry done there 
(p. 92-p. 93). 
Plaintiff answered certain interrogatories pro-
pounded by defendants and these answers were intro-
duced in evidence (p. 94). The interrogatories are found 
in the record at page 15 and the answers at page ~S. From 
these answers appear the following facts: The electrical 
:-;PITicP for 2111 "\YalkPr Lane was applied for in hi~ 
nmne and was IH'n'r changed. The gas seiTice \Ya~ 
applied for in his wife's nmne and was neYer changed. 
II is :-;on attended the Oakwood School during the school 
yPar:-; of 19-!8-19-!9, 19-!9-1950, 1950-1951. He attended 
Highland Park School in the school year of 1951-195~. 
Pia inti l'l''s address given thP sehool authorities was ~111 
Walker Lane during all of the ye.ars his son attended 
tlw Oakwood School. On his lTtal1 Inc01ne tax returns 
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for the years 1949, 1950 and 1951, plaintiff gave his 
address as 2111 Walker Lane. 
The mail box at 2111 \V alker Lane had the N.ame 
"J. W. Spencer" on it (p. 131). Lt. vVilliam Heninger 
testified that it was common knowledge that both he and 
the plaintiff lived in the county and that a few days 
before the service of the discharge order on l\1ay 29, 
1951, he advised plaintiff to move into the city but 
plaintiff replied with considerable heat that he would 
not move into the city (p. 128). 
It further appears from the testin1ony of Chief 
Crowther and Calvin Behle, who was chairman of the 
Civil Service Commission, that the Civil Service Com-
mission attempted to settle the matter by getting plain-
tiff to move back into the city and then be given reinstate-
ment. A meeting with plaintiff, his attorney, the Chief, 
l\fr. Behle and counsel for the City was held July 9, 1951. 
It was there .agreed that plaintiff should have a reason-
able time to move into the city and be reinstated. The 
time was extended to just after Labor Day. See testi-
mony of Crowther (p. 114-18) and Behle (p. 121-22). 
l\fr. Behle further testified that plaintiff's attorney 
informed him that plaintiff had decided not to sell his 
home and would not move into the city. Because of this 
decision by plaintiff, and the f.act that the District Court 
in a companion case brought h,v Edward Jackson had 
held that the Civil Service Commission had no jurisdic-
tion arising out of a discharge because of rc>~idence out-
side the city, the case before the Commission was closed 
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(p. 123). The minutes of the Civil Service Commission, 
Exhibit 7, show the sequence of events, the July 9th 
meeting, the extension of time to move into the City to 
September 4, 1951, the decision of plaintiff not to move 
back into the City and the denial of plaintiff's request 
for a hearing before the Commission and dismissal of 
his appeal by the Commission on November 1, 1951. 
X otice of this dismissal was served upon plaintiff under 
date of November 2, 1951, as shown by Exhibit 12. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT LACKED JURISDICTION OF THE SUB-
JECT MATTER. 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFF WAS BARRED BY LACHES TO MAINTAIN 
THIS ACTION. 
POINT III. 
PLAINTIFF'S ACTION SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR 
FAILURE TO PROSECUTE DILIGENTLY. 
POINT IV. 
THE EVIDENCE SUSTAINS THE COURT'S FINDING 
AND CONCLUSION THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT A RESI-
DENT OF SALT LAKE CITY AT THE TIME OF HIS RE-
MOVAL FROM THE POLICE DEPARTMENT. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING AND 
ADJUDGING PLAINTIFF WAS LAWFULLY DISMISSED 
FROM THE POLICE DEPARTMENT. 
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THE COURT LACKED JURISDICTION OF THE SUB-
JECT MATTER. 
The record shows that in the spring of 1950 the 
Chief of Police issued a regulation that all officers must 
be bona fide residents of S.alt Lake City. See Exhibit 8 
and plaintiff's testimony page (69). This was in harmony 
with the provisions of 10-6-6, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, which reads : 
"No person shall be eligible to any office, 
elective or appointive, who is not a qualified elec-
tor of the city or town." 
Holding office while ineligible would be a violation 
of this statute and would constitute misconduct and 
incompetency under the rules ,and regulations of the 
Civil Service Commission. Section 4-1 of these rules 
and regulations, page 48 of Exhibit 10, provides for 
removal from office for "misconduct, incompetency or 
failure to perform their duties or failure to observe 
properly the rules of the department wherein they are 
employed." Section 4-2 defines misconduct, among other 
things, as (a) "violation of the laws of the State of Utah 
relating to the conduct and authority of the employee 
charged;" (d) "failure to properly observe the rules and 
regulations of the Civil Service Commission." Section 
4-5, page 50, defines failure to observe rules "disobedi-
ency of the orders of a superior officer or the general 
orders and rules of the department where employed.'' 
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Plaintiff was discharged for failure to observe these 
regulations which are based upon the above statutory 
provision which makes him ineligible to hold office. 
Plaintiff appealed to the Civil Service Commission. The 
Chief of Police filed his complaint against plaintiff 
with that commission. The appeal was taken pursuant 
to section 10-10-21, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Under 
the terms of that section jurisdiction to pass upon the 
rightfulness of the discharge is vested solely in the Civil 
Service Commission and its decision thereon is final. 
We respectfully submit that a discharge based upon 
non-residence comes within the terms of the above re-
ferred to section which, by its terms, empowers the head 
of the department to remove a person for misconduct, 
incompetency or failure to perform his duties or failure 
to observe properly the rules of the department. If such 
dereliction does not cmne within the purview of this 
language then there would be no power in the chief to 
remove an officer for that cause. ~\ suit would have to 
he conunenced by smneone in the nature of quo warranto 
·to te~t the officer's right to hold office when he does not 
re~ide within the eity. 'Ye sub1nit the legislature did 
not intend such a result. The question of jurisdiction 
1nay be raised at any tin1e and may be raised sua sponte 
hy t liP eourt itself. -! c .. T.~ .• Sec. -!;). p. l~S: Oldroyd r . 
. 1/ cC rea, 65 {I tah 1-t~, ~;~;) P. 580. 
Our nwtion to disn1iss for lack of jurisdiction should 
have been sustained. 
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POINT II. 
PLAINTIFF WAS BARRED BY LACHES TO MAINTAIN 
THIS ACTION. 
This action was not commenced until May 1, 1953, 
23 months after the effective date of the discharge and 
18 months after the denial by the Civil Service Com-
mission of plaintiff's appeal to that body. There is 
nothing in the complaint to explain or excuse such delay. 
In .a case of this kind, involving a public office, the 
burden was on plaintiff to allege facts showing due dili-
gence. City of Indiana vs. State) 70 N.E. 2d, 635. See 
also State vs. District Court) 74 P. 497 One who seeks to 
compel his reinstatement to a civil service position must 
act promptly or be guilty of laches; Hayman vs. City of 
Los Angeles) 62 P. 2d 1049; Hicks vs. City of Los 
Angeles) J82 P. 2d 1046; 35 Am. Jur. Section 312, 
Page 65. 
In 145 A.L.R. 767, this question of laches and acqui-
escence is extensively .annotated. Cases are there col-
lected which hold a delay of 18 months, one year, 15 
months, 14 months, 10 months, 6 months, and so on, 
is sufficient to bar an action because of laches. Cases 
involving police officers are found on Page 779. See 
also Corcoran vs. City of Los Angeles, 289 P 2<1 556. 
We submit that our motion to dismiss on the ground of 
laches should have been sustained. 
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POINT III. 
PLAINTIFF'S ACTION SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR 
F AlLURE TO PROSECUTE DILIGENTLY. 
Defendants filed their answer to plaintiff's com-
plaint on June 9, 1953. The case was set to be tried in 
June of 1953. No trial was held although defendants 
were prepared for trial. On July 6, 1955, more than two 
years later, the plaintiff filed a motion to file an amended 
complaint, as in the meantime changes had occurred in 
the personnel of the City Commission and the Civil Serv-
ive Commission. This motion was heard August 11th at 
which time defendants moved to dismiss for failure to 
prosecute diligently under rule 41 (b), rtah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The court denied this motion. We sub-
mit that the same considerations that make laches a bar 
to this kind of an action also require diligent prosecution 
by the plaintiff. Plaintiff's action should have been dis-
missed. 
POINT IV. 
THE EVIDENCE SUSTAINS THE COURT'S FINDING 
AND CONCLUSION THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT A RESI-
DENT OF SALT LAKE CITY AT THE TIME OF HIS RE-
MOVAL FROM THE POLICE DEPARTMENT. 
Section 10-6-6 has been quoted heretofore. Seetion 
20-:2-13, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides as follows: 
'•A resident within the 111eaning of this title 
is a person who has resided or v~rill haYe resided 
continuously within this state for one year, and 
in the eounty four 1nonth, and in the precinct sixty 
rla~'f' next preceding the day of the next ensuing 
election." 
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The pertinent parts of Section 20-2-14, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 read as follows: 
(1) "That place must be considered and held to 
be the residence of a person in which his habi-
tation is fixed, and to which, whenever he is ab-
sent, he has the intention of returning." 
( 8) "The place where a man's family resides is 
presumed to be his place of residence, but any 
man who takes up or continues his abode with the 
intention of remaining at a place other than where 
his family resides must be regarded as a resident 
where he so resides." 
( 9) "A change of residence can only be made 
by the act of removal joined with the intent to re-
main in another place. There can only be but 
one residence. A residence cannot be lost until 
another is gained." 
Eligibility to office must continue while J1nlrFro: 
office and this rule applies to a police officer. In State 
vs. Shores, 48 Utah 76, 157 P. 225, the court construed 
Section 221 C.L. 1907, now Section 10-6-6, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, and held that a police officer is an 
officer within that statute and that the word "eligible" 
means "capability of being legally chosen, and related 
to the legal capacity of being appointed, elected or chosen, 
as well as holding." That the word "eligible" means cap-
able of holding an office is also held by the following 
cases: People vs. Leonard, 73 Cal. 230, 14 P. 853; State 
vs. Clarke, 3 Nev. 556; Helwig vs. PayJic, 194 Cal. 524, 
2-H P. 884; State ex rel Summerfield vs. Clarke, 21 Nev. 
:333, 31 p. 545. 
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Residence under the election statutes means domicile 
and not mere physical presence at a place. In Beauregard 
vs. Gunnison City, 48 Utah 515,160 P. 815, the court says: 
"The domicile of a married man is presumed 
to be at the place where his wife or family resides. 
If Mrs. Knighton lived, that is, was domiciled in 
voting district No. 1, the presumption is that her 
husband also lived there, and the presumption 
would prevail until the contrary is shown.'' 
State vs. Savre, 129 Iowa 122, 105 X.W. 387, 3 
L.R.A.N.S. 455, holds that the "word 'residence,' as em-
ployed in the election statutes is synonomous with 'home,' 
or 'domicile' and means a fixed or permanent abode 
or habitation to which the party, when absent, intends 
to return. Ordinarly little difficulty is experienced in 
determining the residence of a man with a family, for 
it is, save in exceptional cases, where the family lives 
or has their home." 
In State YS. Atti, 21 A. :?d 603, where defendant was 
convicted of voting in a district in which he was not .a 
resident, the court says: 
"A person may have n1ore than one residence 
but may not have n1ore than one domicile. His 
permanent home is his dmnicile and the place of 
his domicile detern1ines his right to vote." 
RPP also 18 Am. J 11 r .. See. 5+, page 216, Annotated 
ca~P~ 1915 C. 7~1:.?: naris Estate, 43 P. 2d 115: Te.ras YS. 
Florida, S;) L. ed. 117!). 
The llH'l"<' faet that plaintiff registered in 1950 from 
tiH' Fairnwnt ApartmPnt~ does not establish that place 4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
as his residence. Such action on the part of plaintiff 
cannot outweigh the facts established by the evidence 
that his home or domicile was at 2111 "\V alker Lane, to 
which place he returned as often as he could and at 
which place he would have stayed except for the require-
ment that he be a resident of the city and to which place 
he always intended to go and to which he did go. The 
facts in this case as outlined in our statement of the 
case are much similar to those in Goldfeter vs. H effer-
man, 99 N.Y.S. 2d 959, where one Hall registered in 
one district and the facts pointed to the conclusion that 
his real residence or domicile was in .another district. 
The case of In Re Stabile, 348 Pa. 587, 36 A. 2d 451, 
is a case where the facts are in every respect similar 
to those in the instant case. This was an action to strike 
Stabile's name from the register of voters in the 8th 
District of the Third Ward of Pittsburg. The facts .are 
these. He owned a dwelling house at 1306 Bedford 
Avenue in that district and ward, having 8 rooms, 4 being 
bedrooms. James Suriano, his wife, and four children 
lived there, rent free, and the utilities were in Suriano's 
name. Here Stabile had lived .all his life up to 1930, 
and he still claims it as his legal residence. He always 
voted from this residence and from no other. In 1930 he 
bought another residence in Mt. Lebanon, where his chil-
dren lived practically all the time. 1-Ie has domestic help 
there but not at the Bedford Street residence. l\1rs. Suri-
ano manages the latter home and Stabile and his wife 
are privileged to sleep, dine and entertain in that home 
whenever they choose so to do. He testified he stayed 
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two or three nights a week at Bedford A venue, sometimes 
a whole week, sometimes longer. His children stay there 
once in awhile; his clothes are at Mt. Lebanon, his chil-
dren go to school at 1ft. Lebanon; sometimes he slept at 
M:t. Lebanon. Mrs. Stabile te~tified all the groceries she 
bought were for the Mt. Lebanon home; they had no 
cooking utensils at the Bedford Street address; when 
she has a family dinner it is held at l\I t. Lebanon. Some-
times she eats meals with her husband at the :\It. Leba-
non address. 
The court .says: 
"It is clear from the reading of this record 
that Stabile's home, i.e., his legal residence, is 
in 1\It. Lebanon and that since 1930 he has at-
tempted to maintain a 'voting residence' at 1306 
Bedford Avenue, Pittsburgh. The act of June 3, 
1937, P.L. 1333, Sec. 704, 25 P.S. Sec. 2814, de-
clares that 'the place where the family of a mar-
ried man or woman resides shall be considered 
and held to be his or her place of residence, except 
where the husband and wife have actually sepa-
rated and live apart * * *.' Stabile and his wife 
have not separated and do not live apart. They 
and their family are a unit and their only family 
home is in l\f t. Lebanon. Stabile calls his Mt. 
Lebanon h01ne his 'sununer h01ne,' but his three 
children reside there all the year around and go 
to school from that h01ne. There is the only place 
where this family 'keeps house, • as Mrs. Stabile's 
te.stimony indicates. The 'Re-Staten1ent of Con-
flict of Laws,' Sec. 13, declares as follows: 'A 
home i ~ a dwelling plare of a person, distinguished 
from other dwelling places of that person by the 
intimacy of the relation between the person and 
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the place.' Sec. 13, comment g., '\Vhen a person 
has his family living with him in a dwelling-place, 
it is strong evidence that the dwelling-place is his 
home.' By every test laid down by the law this 
appellant's home in Mt. Lebanon Township is his 
legal residence. 
"The courts have never accepted the con-
tention sometimes made that a man's legal resi-
dence is wherever he says it is or where he says 
he intends it to be. An individual's legal residence 
is a question of fact which the state has .a para-
mount interest in determining. A voter can vote 
only where his legal residence is; he can hold 
public office only if he resides in the political 
division his office serves." 
* * * * 
"Residence indicates permanency of abode as 
distinct from mere lodging or boarding. One of 
the rules for determining a person's residence, as 
prescribed in Sec. 704 (a) of the Election Code 
of 1937, 25 P.S. Chap. 2814 (.a), supra, is the 
following: 'That place shall be considered the 
residence of a person in which his habitation is 
fixed, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has 
the intention of returning.' 
"No one reading this record can doubt that 
the place to which Stabile 'intends to return' 
when he is away from home is the place in Mt. 
Lebanon where his wife, with the aid of a servant, 
keeps house and where his three young children 
sleep and eat and have practically all their exist-
ence, except for a few hours five days a week 
when they .are in school. There and not to the 
Suriano home in Pittsburgh is where he goes when 
he returns from his labors, to the 'bosom of his 
family.' That is his home and his home is his 
legal residence." 
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As stated in State vs. Savre, supra, "a person cannot 
live in one place and by force of imagination constitute 
some other his place of abode." It is quite significant 
that plaintiff did not call his wife to testify. If anyone 
would know that plaintiff had established a domicile 
separate from her and her family she would. 
We have not attempted to re-state the evidence 
under this heading, as we feel that statement of facts 
as made sufficiently shows that this case is in all respects 
within the facts and rules of law set out in the Stabile 
and Goldfetter cases, supra. 
\V e submit that under the facts contained in the 
record there is ample evidence to sustain the court's 
finding of fact that plaintiff was not a resident of Salt 
Lake City at the time of his removal fr01n the police 
department. That finding may not be disturbed if there 
is evidence to sustain it. \Y e go further and assert, the 
court could not, upon tllis record have found otherwise. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING AND 
ADJUDGING PLAINTIFF WAS LAWFULLY DISMISSED 
FROM THE POLICE DEPARTMENT. 
Since the record mnply sustains the finding that 
plaintiff wa~ not a resident of Salt Lake City at the 
tim<' of hi~ n'moyal. the conc.lusion of law'" follows that he 
wn~ lawl'ull.Y di~eharged fr01n the polic.e department. 
liP could 11ot hold officP in that deparhnent if ineligible. 
h'~fale v~. ~"-Nwrcs ...... ·upra, and cases c.ited under Point-!. 
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Furthermore, he was in violation of the rules of the de-
partment and the rules and regulations of the Civil 
Service Commission as pointed out in Point I. 
CONCLUSION 
The record is clear that plaintiff's atte.mpt to estab-
lish a residence in Salt Lake City, while his family re-
sided outside the city .at the vValker Lane dwelling was 
wholly specious. Under the .statute he could have only 
one residence and under this record that was where his 
family lived. Not being a resident of Salt Lake City, he 
became ineligible to hold office as a police officer of 
that city. He was in direct violation of the regulation of 
the department that he must be a resident of Salt Lake 
City. This rendered him incompetent to discharge the 
duties of a police officer and constituted misconduct as 
well. We re·spectfully submitt that plaintiff's action 
should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, laches and 
failure prosecute diligently, or that the judgment of the 
trial court dismissing plaintiff's action should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CHRISTENSEN 
City Attorney 
HOMER HOLMGREN 
Assistant City Attorney 
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